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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES F. TREES 
Plaintiff, Respondent, ' 
vs. ' 
WALTER M. LEWIS, ] 
Defendant, Appellant. 1 
1 RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
1 No. 19333 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Respondent James F. Trees sought specific 
performance on several theories of an agreement to purchase part 
of the old Shunesburg Ranch. Alternativelyf Respondent sought 
damages from his purchase of the remaining 1,067 acres of the 
Ranch at Appellant's insistence, as a condition precedent to 
purchasing Appellant's portion of the Ranch. Appellant claimed 
that there had been little more than an outstanding counteroffer, 
which Respondent had orally rejected, thus terminating 
Respondent's power of acceptance. 
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
An advisory jury empaneled at Appellant's request 
unanimously found for Respondent. The Honorable J. Harlan Burns 
specifically adopted the jury's answers, entered additional 
consistent findings, and reaffirmed the jury verdict. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent states that Appellant's failure to comply 
with Rule 75 (p) (2) (2) (d) U.R.C.P. allows this Court to summarily 
assume the correctness of both the jury verdict and trial judgment 
below. Respondent also seeks affirmation of the jury verdict on 
several alternative grounds. Lastly, Respondent asserts that 
Appellant has waived or abandoned his right to an appeal by 
accepting Respondent's tender subsequent to trial and voluntarily 
vacating the subject matter property. 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment/ or an order 
requiring that this matter be retried. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant's statement of the facts fails to comply with 
Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d) U.R.C.P. Selective and self-serving, with no 
citation to the record, it is contrary to the overwhelming 
evidence in this case, the jury verdict, and the judgment and 
decree of specific performance. Consequently, Respondent is 
compelled by Rule 75(p)(2) U.R.C.P. to independently state the 
tacts supporting the same with appropriate citation to the record. 
The Respondent James F. Trees obtained a liberal arts 
education from DePauw University, and graduate degrees from 
Harvard University. T138. In the fall of 1980, he came to Utah 
looking for ground aesthetically beautiful and remote upon which 
to conduct a small-scale agricultural operation and 
self-sufficient farm. T130. Being previously acquainted with 
Utah, Trees was particularly interested in property near Zion 
National Park. Upon viewing the old Shunesburg Ranch with his 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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agent, a Mr. Hogle from Arizona, Trees fell in love with it, 
T130; PI. 
Historically, Mormon pioneers first developed the eld 
Shunesburg Ranch around 1860 at Brigham Young's request that the 
headwaters of the Virgin River be managed for agricultural 
purposes. T557-58. Indian ruins on the property evidence earlier 
inhabitants, the ancient cliff-dwellers. Id.. When Trees first 
visited Shunesburg, its ownership was in two parties: the DeMille 
family, who originally owned the entire Ranch, and Walter Lewis. 
The DeMille parcel, though comprising 1,067 acres, has a dedicated 
water right sufficient for only 8.7 acres, and can best be 
described as a "rough, rocky parcel of property". T541. 
Appellant himself graciously characterized it as "nothing but 
hills and rocks". First Deposition of Walter Lewis [hereinafter 
1DWL] at 42. The cross-hatched area on PI shows the remaining 160 
acres of the old Shunesburg Ranch then owned by Appellant. 
T41-42. Abutted to the east and north by Zion National Park and 
surrounded by federeil ground, this property consists of two 
separate pieces, one being the entryway into the old Shunesburg 
Ranch, and the other comprising the main farm on the far east 
side. Containing 90% of the arable land and a vast majority of 
the water right, Appellant described it as the "heart" of the 
Ranch. 1DWL at 42; T41. This property also had a habitable 
residence with an adjoining guest house. T556. While Appellant's 
counsel refers to still another "home" as the Shunesburg 
"mansion", the "mansion", as such, is little more than an 
uninhabitable "relic" in the words of his client. T556-57; Second 
3 
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Deposition of Walter Lewis [hereinafter 2DWL] at 120, cf. 
Appellant's Brief [hereinafter AB] at 2. 
In 1980, Appellant resided in a suburb of Chicago, 
Illinois. President of Stereo Optical Company, he was a man of 
considerable education, with an advanced degree in accounting, 
training in civil engineering, and a doctorate in optometry. 
T40-42, 109. Having acquired the Utah ranch seven years earlier, 
Appellant had only been able to spend some weeks in the summer and 
a few Christmases there. T555. 
During this time, Appellant often indicated that if he 
sold the property, he would want a buyer with lots of money who 
did not know what to do with it. T490, 559-60. When Trees 
requested to visit the property in 1980, Lewis consented. T563. 
And, while Trees continued to be represented by Mr. Hogle, Lewis 
was being contacted by a local agent, Mr. Milne. While Appellant 
indicates that Trees hired Milne to acquire an option on the 
property, at trial, Milne's agency for either party remained 
unproven. Se<e AB at 3; cf:. Finding of Fact [hereinafter F] 7. 
After visiting the property, Milne advised Lewis that 
Trees and Hogle were pur suing the property, and the parties 
arranged for a meeting in Chicago. T563-64. At this meeting, 
Lewis arrived prepared with maps, descriptions of the water 
rights, and several slides of the ranch specifically to increase 
Trees' interest in the property. T564-65. Trees then asked Lewis 
if he could look at the ranch once more, and Lewis subsequently 
decided that he would meet Trees at the ranch. T565; 1DWL14. 
4 
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At this later meeting, Mr. Hatch, an agent for Mr. 
Milne, brought an appraisal requested by Lewis showing a total 
value his portion of the old Shunesburg Ranch as being $230,000. 
Early discussions regarding a deferred purchase price with 8% 
interest were entertained. T577. While nowhere mentioned in his 
brief, Appellant then also revealed that he had less than a 
neighborly relationship with the DeMilles, who Appellant claimed 
had tried to steal some of his water. 2DWL131-32. And, through 
extensive negotiations regarding the purchase of the Lewis ranch, 
Appellant remained adamant that Trees should first be able to 
acquire the DeMille property. See Fl, 2; T89-90, 593-94; P23. At 
this meeting, the potential of deeding Lewis1 property to EYU and 
having Trees then purchase it with an annuity back to Lewis was 
also discussed. After Lewis met with Mr. Kimber Ricks of BYU, 
Lewis rejected it as economically unattractive. Appellant also 
indicated desires to retain some visitation to the ranch, with 
which Trees was perfectly comfortable. T567-68. Suggestions 
pertaining to Lewis1 retention of the habitable home for sixty 
days with a perennial lease to Trees for ten months each year and 
a purchase option upon Lewis1 demise were also discussed. T570. 
Ultimately, Lewis indicated that by reason of his wife's ill 
health, it would be more convenient to him to occasionally stay 
overnight, and that he would build another, more accessible home 
nearly on property he also owned. T509-10, 560. Nonetheless, 
Lewis persisted that his desires to retain some rights of 
visitation would be more comfortably accommodated if the DeMilles 
were first removed from Shunesburg. T593-94. 
5 
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Early on Appellant sought advice from several 
professionals, including an attorney, in reference to these 
negotiations. T568, 578-80. After Appellant rejected Trees1 
offer of $230,000 as insufficiently attractive, Trees then 
increased his net purchase price to $270,000 and the interest rate 
to 14%. T584-85. Appellant, then feeling good about his 
negotiations with Trees, communicated to Trees that he would 
accept this offer. T585-86. Because both parties now desired to 
unify the ranch under Trees' ownership, they decided that Trees 
would take an "option" on the Lewis property, pending his 
potential ability to acquire the DeMille parcel. See F2; T131, 
370. 
Appellant then phoned Trees on the 3rd of December. 
T594. During this conversation, Trees suggested that he could 
stable Appellant's horse on the property to facilitate Appellant's 
enjoyment of his visitation rights. T594-95. Mr. Steven E. Snow, 
Trees' attorney and attorney-in-fact, then drafted the real estate 
option, P5, and Mr. Hatch took it to Chicago for Appellant's 
signature. T317. Hatch, as an agent of Milne, also took a 
listing agreement which, as executed by Lewis, indicated a gross 
purchase price of $300,000, with a $30,000 commission to be 
divided between Hogle and Milne. T513; P54; F5. 
Though Trees was familiar with the essentials of P5, 
Snow had reviewed it with him only orally and it had not been read 
to him. T142-43. By oversight, Snow initially failed to include 
a visitation provision in the original document. T313. Prior to 
6 
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executing P5, however, two handwritten changes were made at 
Appellant's request. T46-47, 586-87, F6. One change regarded tax 
ramifications upon the occurrence of accelerated payments, and 
neither party claimed any materiality regarding it. See F8. The 
latter change drafted by Appellant as an addendum on page 4 of P5 
became the focal point of Appellant's case. It states as follows: 
"Additionally, it is understood that there exists an agreement 
between optionee and optionor for mutually agreeable visitation 
rights for optionor." 
Hatch telephoned Trees regarding the change, and as this 
provision reflected a then existing agreement of which Trees was 
fully aware, he said it was fine. T49, 131, 151-52. Indeed, the 
trial court specifically found that both parties understood the 
terms of Appellant's retained visitation prior to Appellant's 
executing P5, and beyond that, that the agreement itself otherwise 
accurately described the property and the negotiated terms of 
sale, including price, manner of payment and security therefor. 
See F10, 55; T78. In reference to his addendum, Appellant 
testified that when it was made he knew what visitation rights had 
been agreed to, and that the agreement then existed between the 
parties. T613-14, 617. Similarly, the trial court found that the 
addendum evidenced an existing oral understanding shared and 
accepted by both parties. See F7. 
Three other negotiated provisions were material to the 
parties' agreement. First, P5, "the option" provided for a 
thirty-day closing period after exercise for the preparation of 
final documents of transfer and retention of security in reference 
7 
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to the proposed sale. F10; P5 at 18. Secondly, Appellant 
conceded that he negotiated and set forth the only manner in which 
Mr. Trees could exercise "the option". T81, 85-86. As required, 
Trees could exercise only . . . 
[b]y depositing in the U. S. mail, postage prepaid, 
written notice to optionor of exercise, addressed to 
optionor accompanied by Thirty-Four Thousand Dollars 
($34,000.00) in lawful money of the United States, cash, 
cashier's check or money order. Said notice must be 
given on or before December 31, 1980. See P5 at S[5; 
F10; T88. 
Lastly, due to Trees' anticipated expense in acquiring the DeMille 
parcel, the parties separately negotiated a provision which 
specifically required Appellant to notify Respondent in writing of 
any perceived failure to perform pursuant to the parties' 
agreement and allow Respondent an opportunity to cure. As 
specifically set forth in paragraph 11 of P5: 
Should optionee fail to comply with any of the terms 
hereof, optionor shall give optionee written notice 
giving particulars in which optionee is in default, and 
should optionee fail to cure such default within ten 
(10) days of mailing of said notice, this contract shall 
be terminated without further act of either party. See 
Fll, T382-83. 
The above provision was uniquely important to Trees, insofar as he 
anticipated spending close to $600,000 in acquiring the DeMille 
property. Noteworthy, in reviewing the parties' negotiations and 
their total agreement, the trial court found that the parties 
intended that paragraph 11 of P5, the December 4th, 1980 document 
. . . would be employed to resolve any disputes between 
them and would allow Defendant an opportunity to specify 
with particularity whatever problems he might have as to 
any tender or variance in the performance of Plaintiff, 
and on the other hand, would allow Plaintiff, upon 
receipt of such notice, an opportunity to cure any 
claimed default. See F53. 
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Two days after executing P5, Appellant copied to Trees a 
letter mailed to the Superintendent of Zion National Park. In 
that letter Appellant indicated that Respondent had an option and 
would take over ownership at the end of the year, but that 
Appellant would maintain some involvement and part-time residency 
during his lifetime. P12. Trees testified that this was 
consistent with his understanding of the parties1 agreement. 
T306. Immediately after the Appellant's execution of P-5, Trees 
authorized the issuance of a check for $1,000 to hold that 
document open through December for Trees1 acceptance. T132-33. 
Appellant received this check on December 9th, 1980. T46-47; F9; 
P9. A cover letter accompanying the check contained the following 
simple statement: 
Enclosed please find check for $1,000.00 as option 
deposit from Mr. James F. Trees as per agreement. P8. 
On December 17th, 1980, Appellant sent a letter and 
enclosure to Mr. Hatch in St. George, the real estate agent who 
had earlier gone to Chicago. In this letter Lewis indicated that, 
though not concerned, he thought "it would be wise to put a 
statement in writing as to the 'agreement' mentioned at the close 
of the option document". P14. Lewis testified that the 
enclosure, marked as P15, did not change the existing 
understanding of the parties, but simply memorialized the same. 
T49-50, 628-29. Similarly, Trees testified that he was 100% in 
agreement with the language set forth in P15. T268. 
Commensurately, the trial court found that P15, as drafted by 
Appellant, merely clarified the details of the then existing oral 
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agreement referred to in P5. And, while P15 on its face required 
the separate physical signature of Trees, Appellant testified that 
it was not material to him, so long as Trees would sign P15 during 
the option's closing period. T122; 2DWL at 50; P5 at 18. 
Consequently, the trial court also found that . . . 
it was not material to Defendant so long as Plaintiff 
agreed to the terms of the writing [P15] and would 
execute the same during the closing period for the 
purchase of the property. F22. 
Appellant's only concern at this time was that if 
Respondent predeceased him after exercise, Appellant would have to 
deal with another party. T624. The trial court incorporated P15 
verbatim in both the decree and the recorded documents pertaining 
to specific performance. See Record, Volume 3 [hereinafter R3] at 
30-31, 38; P59 and 60, Supplemental Record filed June, 1984. 
A series of stipulations now becomes material to the 
subsequent recitation of facts. Under Higlee v. McDonald, 
No. 18755, filed April 27th, 1984, they are conclusive and binding 
on the parties, preclude the adoption of conflicting findings, and 
should be of particular interest to this Court: 
(1) [B]oth parties stipulated that the December 
17th enclosure (P15) was part and parcel of the 
December 4 document entitled real estate option 
(P5), insofar as it clarified the addendum thereto, 
and both Plaintiff and Defendant further stipulated 
that it accurately and adequately set forth their 
agreement pertaining to visitation. F20; see also 
T*12/8/82-12/9/82; T136. 
(2) [D]efendant granted three written extensions of P5 
and Pi5; thus, these instruments, taken together, 
were held open until May 30th, 1981 by Defendant 
for acceptance by Plaintiff. F25. 
(3) [R]egardless of whether the December 4th, 1980 
document entitled real estate option as clarified 
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by the December 17th, 1980 memorialization was an 
option or a counteroffer, the same was held out by 
the Defendant for the Plaintiff's acceptance 
through May 30th, 1981, T346-47, F29. 
(4) Plaintiff tendered orally and in writing to pay the 
amount of money required by the documents, with 
agreed credit for amounts previously received by 
the Defendant for extensions. (T 12/8/82-12/9/82; 
T347. 
(5) From and after the 30th of May, 1981, the Defendant 
did at no time notify Mr. Trees specifying any 
defect or failure in Mr. Trees' tender or 
performance. T136, 410-12. 
(6) Defendant further stipulated that concurrently the 
Plaintiff was not in default in any particular in 
his obligations from December 4th, 1980 up through 
and including May 30th, 1981, which proposition the 
court specifically accepted. F14. 
(7) Lastly, at trial the parties stipulated that P5 and 
P15 were to be considered together as but one 
document and treated as the same. F17. 
Exhibit P15 as mailed to Hatch by Lewis was subsequently 
left by Hatch at the St. George offices of attorney Snow. F24. 
Until May 27th, 1981, Lewis never inquired of anyone about P15, 
and indeed, despite "abundant opportunity", would speak to neither 
Hatch nor Trees about the same. F26. Meanwhile, Trees was not 
informed of P15. By mid-December, 1980, Trees, in good faith, was 
engrossed in immediate negotiations with the DeMilles which 
initially were not fruitful. F25. 
As previously stated, whether denominated as an "option" 
or "counteroffer", Appellant's offer to sell remained open through 
May 30th, 1981, by reason of three written extensions for which, 
in part, $1,500 was paid as consideration to be credited toward 
"exercising the option". F25. Trees' frequent reports that he 
was having difficulty closing with the DeMilles were the basis for 
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each extension. T52-53. With each request for an extension, 
Respondent would personally contact Appellant, after which would 
follow a call to Appellant by Respondent's attorney, Mr. Snow. 
F25. On other occasions, Trees simply called Appellant to discuss 
problems he was having with the DeMilles concerning mineral 
rights, access, or negotiations regarding price. To encourage the 
DeMilles to sell, Appellant told them that if they would sell he 
had an option agreement that would doubtless be exercised, and 
that he would sell also. T632. Unbeknownst to Trees, however, 
Appellant had also been contacted through Dale Docksteader, yet 
another real estate agent, by Robert Redford regarding the 
property. In late March, Appellant finally told Trees about 
Redford. T624-25. Meanwhile, pending Respondent's solving his 
problems with the DeMilles, Appellant covertly felt that P15 was 
concededly unimportant. T352; see Answer to Interrogatory No. 55, 
Rl at 352. 
The trial court found that in each extension granted by 
Appellant . . . 
the words used by the parties in reference to the nature 
of their agreement were "The Option" and in Defendant's 
[Appellant's] mind the word "option" referred to the 
December 4th and 17th documents [P5, P15], which taken 
together comprised in their entirety Defendant's 
proposal to sell the property. F27. 
During the same period of time, the DeMilles also spoke to 
Appellant, who was well aware of Trees' difficulty with them. 
T589. As Trees became concerned about losing Appellant's property 
to Mr. Redford, Appellant became increasingly impatient due to 
Trees' failure to reach an agreement with the DeMilles and 
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exercise "the option". T25, 591-92. Ultimately, Snow proposed 
that Trees exercise the option prior to reaching an agreement with 
the DeMilles, but Appellant was again adamant that Trees not 
exercise the option absent this condition. T382, 593. As 
Appellant specifically stated in his last extension: 
I, Walter M. Lewis, hereby extend the option of 
Nov. 1980 for another 30 days. 
As my part is dependent on Jim's first being able 
to acquire the DeMille property, I don't know how else 
we could do this—but extensions cannot of course go on 
indefinitely as there is a considerable financial loss 
involved for me each time. Sincerely, /s/ Walter M. 
Lewis P23. 
It was conceded by Lewis at trial that even though P23 
refers to a November, 1980 option, Appellant's intended reference 
was to P5. F28; T54. Clearly, however, Lewis1 sale depended on 
Trees first being able to acquire the DeMille property. T54. 
Appellant conceded that during the spring of 1981 he had 
at least five conversations with Trees. TG19. Trees placed the 
figure at closer to ten. T291. Appellant had additional 
conversations with Snow. Several of the problems with the 
DeMilles were amplified upon, and other matters, including mineral 
rights, a potential location for Trees' post office box, and 
maximization of access to the Ranch by constructing a bridge were 
discussed. T291-92, 321-23; see also F25. Despite these 
conversations, however, Appellant never spoke to Hatch or Trees 
about P15, the December 17th memorandum, until late May of 1981, 
despite abundant opportunities to do so! F26. While the evidence 
conflicted regarding the substance of conversations between 
Appellant and attorney Snow during this period, the trial court, 
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nonetheless, found that no issue of importance ever arose between 
the parties on or before May 27th, 1981. Id. 
On May 26th, 1981, after a substantial expenditure of 
time and attorney's fees, and in conformity with Appellant's 
demand that Trees first be able to acquire the DeMille property, 
Trees successfully completed his negotiations with the DeMilles. 
See F30; T251-60, 276, 278-79, 327-30. Thus, on that date, 
subject only to Trees' proceeding in good faith to close, his 
transaction with the DeMilles had been successfully culminated, 
and Trees' ability to close with the DeMilles was never raised as 
an issue. See F31 and 32. Despite an appraisal indicating that 
the DeMille property alone had a value of only $613,000, Trees 
ultimately paid $846,000 to acquire it. See P58; £f. T136-38. 
On May 27th, 1981, Trees excitedly phoned Appellant to 
report that he had successfully completed his negotiations with 
the DeMilles. T309-10. Appellant now characterizes this 
conversation as Respondent's oral rejection of his "counteroffer", 
a term which Appellant first conceived at the insistence of his 
attorney seme two weeks later. T613? 2DWL at 87, 109; AB 5, 7-8. 
The thrust of this conversation, if closely scrutinized, however, 
rejected nothing, and instead evidenced Trees' firm commitment to 
comply with the parties' bargain. See F33. Trees related the 
conversation on pages 279-81 of the transcript as follows: 
I called Walter. I was feeling quite good, because we 
had many discussions over the past previous two or three 
months. He was aware that I was trying to settle this 
dispute with the DeMilles. In fact he gave me some 
suggestions about it. . . I probably said something 
like, "Good morning, Walter." I said I was really happy 
and I thought he would be very happy. And I said, "I 
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settled the DeMille situation. I am able to close on 
it." And he [Mr. Lewis] went blank; there was a silence 
and he still didn't say anything. And that felt very 
weird to roe because we had been having very warm 
conversations over the previous months. So I thought 
maybe he was upset because (Objection by Mr. Bell) . . . 
I next said, "Well, Walter, I know you wanted the 
initial payment split in two tax years to save taxes." 
And I said, "Because of the delays that, you know, no 
longer applies, I'll be happy to do that for you the 
next year," if that was what he was upset about. 
Trees then explained that in late December, the payment schedule 
allowed Appellant to spread the initial income over two tax years, 
and that Trees was willing to do that if a May exercise was 
otherwise problematic to Lewis. T281-82. Trees then continued: 
Then there was kind of a silence and then he said 
something like, and he was kinda hot, and he said, 
"Where is the write-up of my sixty-day write-up," or 
something like that. T283. 
At this point in time Trees thought Lewis may have been referring 
to the old lease, as he had never in fact heard of P15 at that 
time and did not know what Lewis was talking about. T172, 217. 
Trees continued as follows: 
I was a little stunned. I didn't know what he was 
talking about. And I said, "Walter, what do you mean?" 
And he said, "Where is the write-up of my sixty 
write-up." Ke did it again in a very angry tone, which 
I had not heard from him before. And I said, "Walter, 
what do you mean. You have no write-up of sixty-day 
rights?" And he blurted out, "You call Mike Hatch. He 
knows all about it." And I said, "Walter, I will. Calm 
down. Let me find out and I'll call Mike Hatch and get 
right back to you." (T282-83) 
This May 27th conversation ended on a very interesting 
note. Trees testified to its conclusion as follows: 
Lewis: "Oh, yeah, . . . if you think that the DeMilles 
have given you a hard time, you haven't seen nothing 
yet." 
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Trees: "Walter, I'll call Mike Hatch. Just calm down. 
I'll be right back to you. Whatever our agreement is 
I'll honor it. I'll get. right back to you." T283. 
Standing alone, the above commentary may appear remarkably 
self-serving, but Lewis also confirmed this ending to the parties' 
conversation. Thus, Appellant, upon cross-examination, 
reluctantly conceded that Trees reaffirmed on the 27th of May that 
he [Trees] would honor his commitments, which Lewis also stated at 
his deposition. T641; 2DWL at 14;7; see also F34. Furthermore, 
Lewis also conceded that he angrily told Trees that if Trees 
thought the DeMilles had given him trouble, that he hadn't seen 
anything yet because he [Lewis] would be a more stubborn foe. 
T649-50; 2DWL at 125. Importantly, from and after May 27th, 1981, 
Appellant took a position resisting the sale, and regardless of 
what Trees did or tendered, Appellant would not close. T 4/1/83 
at 29-30; 2DWL 110, 125; T213, 650. Indeed, after May 27th, Trees 
never understood why Lewis would not close, and Lewis would never 
explain why. T612. Lewis conceded that he initially contacted 
Mr. Bell following this conversation, and that thereafter he 
resisted any further pursuit of the matter. T601-03, 642. 
Appellant evasively then told Snow that he was simply not happy 
with the transaction. T-387. He told Trees that he had simply 
lost faith. Often he was simply silent. Regardless, the trial 
court found that after May 27th, 1981 there was not . . . 
anything that James Trees could have done to bring about 
a satisfactory consummation of it, from the proof . . . 
[the trial judge] heard. (T 4/1/83 at 28-29; T213. 
Immediately after conversing with Lewis, Trees, at 
Lewis' instruction, phoned Hatch. Hatch, in turn, then phoned 
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Lewis, and Trees, at Hatch's direction, then contacted Snow, who 
though previously not aware of the contents of P15, now studied it 
very carefully. T358-59, 417, 600. 
On May 28th, 1981, Trees again phoned Snow who advised 
Trees that P15 comported with the parties1 agreement. T238; F36. 
As Jim Trees was then in Sagaponack, New York, on May 29th, 1983 
he again phoned Snow to obtain instructions on how to exercise ?: 
"the option11, having decided to accept both P5 and P15 as drafted* -'f ^  
T184, 146-47. Snow then dictated to Trees the letter mailed bn.6 
pursuant to paragraph 11 of P5. T147, 424-25; P24. A cashier's Mite 
check for $32,500 was also tendered as required for exercise with 
credit for the $1,500 previously received by Lewis. Id., P25. 
P24, addressed to Walter Lewis and timely mailed on May 29th, 
1981, states in pertinent part as follows: 
Dear Walter: In accordance with the terms of our 
contract, and the extensions hereof, I hereby exercise -
my option to purchase the property in Utah. 
Sincerely, James F. Trees. : n r 
Again, regardless of the content of the May 27th, 1981 
conversation, both parties stipulated that whether Lewis' offer be 
characterized as an option or a counteroffer, the same was left 
open for acceptance through May 30th, 1981. Sufrra at 10-11. And 
while Trees used the words "the option" in referring to both P5 
and P15, as did Appellant, the trial court did not find the letter 
itself unambiguous. See e.g., T 4/14/83 at 5. Clarifying any 
ambiguity, Trees testified that this letter was meant to 
incorporate both P5 and P15, treating the same as one dbcuMent, to 
which the parties stipulated. T145, 147-48, 211-12, 214, 222; 
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supra at 10-11; see also T376-78, 428-29, 669, 470. The trial 
court, adopting the jury's findings, also found that regardless of 
the documents1 nomenclature, that is, whether denominated together 
as an option or counteroffer, that Respondent, by his letter and 
tendered cashier's check, did accept any and all counteroffers, 
options or proposals in whatever form had been submitted by both 
P5 and P15. (See F13, 19, 29, 44; T 4/1/83 at 29-30) Trees never 
has withdrawn this tender. See F44, 45. 
FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 
Shortly after P24 and P25 were mailed on May 29th, 1983, 
and prior to withdrawing Appellant's offer, Appellant received 
them. T94-F49. Though the tender was consistent with the terms 
of the parties' agreement, Lewis, nonetheless, advised several 
people, including Trees, that he would no longer close the 
transaction. T209, 376, 477, 635, 642; P24. Subsequently, Trees 
actively explored what Lewis wanted, with Lewis himself conceding 
that Trees even begged him what additional performance was 
required as a condition precedent to closing. See T136-37. A 
perusal of Lewis' deposition reveals the following: 
Q: (By Mr. Hughes) After May 28th, do you recall Mr. 
Trees at any time saying words to the effect that 
"Walter [Mr. Lewis], please tell me what you want, put 
in writing what you want so I can comply"? 
A: (By Mr. Lewis) As time went on, he said that 
several times. (2DWL at 93-94) 
Though Trees tried to close several times saying he 
would sign any additional document Lewis wanted, Lewis, in 
response, never told or wrote Trees how his tender was 
insufficient and stubbornly refused to close. T107, 127, 209, 
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635-36. Thus, Trees never knew what else Lewis desired as a 
condition precedent to closing. T136-37. The trial court 
similarly found that though Appellant kept Trees' tender for two 
weeks, neither Appellant nor his agents ever objected to its 
sufficiency or nature. See F49-52. The trial court further found 
that even beyond the obvious statutory proscriptions regarding 
tender, Appellant should have contractually employed paragraph 11 
of P5 to resolve any problem he might have had with Trees' 
performance. See F3. 
Finally, on June 12th, Appellant overtly took a "new 
position", refusing Trees' performance and shutting the door on 
the transaction. 2DWL at 110, P26. Communicated by Appellant's 
attorney's letter, this was the first written communication from 
Lewis to Trees after May 29th. P26; T644. In that letter, Mr. 
Bell used the word "counteroffer" in reference to P5 and P15 for 
the first time. T613; 2DWL at 109. Mr. Bell also suggested these 
words to Lewis, even though Lewis had previously referred to both 
documents as "the option". See 2DWL at 87. On June 13th, over 
two weeks after Trees' tender, Appellant returned it, without 
comment or clarification. See F56; P27. 
ATTEMPTED SETTLEMENT 
A few days later Lewis advised both Milne and Trees that 
his lawyer, Mr. Bell, had found P15 unacceptable. T162, 188-89, 
209, 391, 393, 483. In settlement discussions with Lewis, several 
proposals drafted by Mr. Milne were submitted. T209, 482. Though 
not exactly what Trees had agreed to as set forth in PI5, Trees 
authorized Snow to execute these proposals, as Lewis had indicated 
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to Milne and Trees that they might be acceptable to him. T206-09, 
162f 188-89, 391, 393, 402; P28, 29. Ultimately, Lewis also 
rejected these proposals generated by Milne. During closing, 
Lewis truly felt that he had fulfilled his promise of May 27th 
that he would give Trees more problems that the DeMilles and be a 
truly harsh opponent. T650-51; 2DWL at 125. 
TRIAL 
At trial the issues were whether P5 and P15 comprised an 
option or a counteroffer, and whether Respondent had accepted the 
same. See F77. Though Mr. Bell appeared openly dissatisfied with 
his client's testimony, the jury, nonetheless, found a 
counteroffer. T647-48; F39, 40. The jury, however, further 
unanimously held that Jim Trees had accepted the same. (F39, 40) 
While the trial judge subjectively felt that P5 and P15 
constituted an option; regardless, he found the evidence clear and 
convincing that in either event Trees had timely accepted the 
same. See T 4/1/83 at 14; F40. The trial court further found 
that the parties1 minds had met, and that despite Trees1 
substantial tender, Lewis never notified Trees of any default or 
insufficiency in Trees' performance. See F40, 43, 46. 
Regarding attorney's fees, the trial court awarded 
Respondent $45,000 after extensive testimony and briefing on the 
issue. See F60, 62; T698-729; R3 at 90, 107. The trial court 
dismissed prima facie Respondent's alternative cause of action for 
economic losses suffered in purchasing the DeMille property. See 
Conclusion of Law No. 10. 
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POST-TRIAL CLOSING 
The trial court established June 17th, 1983f as a 
closing date. R4 at 39-43. A deed and mortgage were subsequently 
recorded recognizing Appellant's agreed right of visitation. P59, 
60; Supp. Record filed 6/84. Trees' original mortgage note was 
delivered to Appellant. R4 at 36, 43. 
In early June of 1983, Appellant's counsel notified both 
Respondent and his counsel that Appellant was vacating the 
premises. See Affidavit of James F. Trees filed 9/27/83, 5s 3-5. 
On June 17th, 1983, Respondent began peacefully residing there. 
Id. Trees has now tendered two checks for $70/000 in conformity 
with the mortgage note and judicial decree. Despite his July, 
1983 appeal, Lewis subsequently cashed these checks. Id., all §s 
with exhibits; see also 75(h) U.R.C.P. order amending record filed 
6/84. No supersedeas bond has been filed. A third $28,000 check 
has also been sent to Appellant. 
POINT I 
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW COMPEL THE 
AFFIRMATION OF THE ADVISORY JURY'S VERDICT AS CONCURRED 
IN BY THE TRIAL COURT 
A. Under Utah law, the Supreme Court does 
not reverse unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the Findings of the trial court. 
Respondent sought specific performance of a written 
contract to convey real estate. A contract's commitments are 
determined from a thorough examination of the circumstances 
pertaining to its execution and formation. See Otteson v. Malone, 
584 P.2d 878 (Utah 1978). While Respondent concedes that specific 
performance of oral contracts may require a greater degree of 
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certainty, regardless, the same burden of proof does not follow 
the trial court decision on appeal as Appellant suggests. See, 
e.g., Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); cf. Pitcher v. 
Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491 (Utah 1967); AB at 9-10. Thus, the Utah 
Supreme Court unanimously holds that even where the level of proof 
at trial is clear and convincing, the appellate court, 
nonetheless, applies the "clearly preponderates standard". See 
Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984). Under this standard, 
the Supreme Court does not reverse the trial court's judgment, 
unless the evidence in the case clearly preponderates against its 
findings. Id.; see also Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 151 (Utah 
1981). Indeed, applying the "clearly preponderates standard", the 
Supreme Court reviews the record, looking for any "reasonable 
basis in the evidence" to justify the trial court's findings. See 
Parks Enterprises, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918 
(Utah 1982); Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); 
and Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980). 
Respondent cites the above because Appellant theorizes 
that Respondent failed to meet his burden of proof. Appellant's 
contentions, however, ignore overwhelming evidence which compelled 
the opposite conclusion of both the jury and the district court 
below, as if to invoke a retrial of the matter on appeal. Thus, 
logical standards of review compel affirmation of the trial 
court's judgment, even in equity cases, unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates against those findings. Indeed, this Court 
will ultimately "assume that the trial judge believed those 
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aspects of the evidence which support his findings and judgment." 
See Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982). 
B. In the instant case the Supreme Court should 
summarily assume the correctness of the trial judgment. 
Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d) U.R.C.P. states that Appellant's 
brief shall contain "a concise statement of the material facts of 
the case citing the pages of the record supporting such 
statement." (Id.) On appeal, Appellant's version of "the facts" 
contains no citation whatsoever to the record or transcript. As 
such, it is clearly not responsive to the purpose and intent of 
Rule 75. See Harmston v. Harmston, No. 19297, filed April 10th, 
1984; and State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). Indeed, 
Appellant's entire brief contains only four or five selective 
references to the trial transcript. Ultimately, Appellant's 
failure to comply with Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d) U.R.C.P. allows that 
this Court will logically assume the correctness of the trial 
court's judgment, rather than, like Alice, pursue the hare in 
search of grounds for reversal. As stated by Justice Durham in 
State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983): 
This Court will assume the correctness of the judgment 
below if counsel on appeal does not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as to making a concise statement of facts and 
citation of the pages in the record where they are 
supported. Id.., citing State v. Tucker, supra; see also 
Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 
(1952). 
Indeed, in asserting his theory of the lawsuit, Appellant 
characterizes as "the facts" allegations which not only are bereft 
of any proper citation, but are also contrary to the trial court's 
findings. In effect, by failing to specify where the findings 
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lack support in the evidence, and asserting "facts" contrary to 
those found by the trial court, Appellant creates such confusion 
that his appeal, logically, should not be considered at all. See 
e.g., Utah-Idaho Sugar Company v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 491, 
210 P. 106 (1922). 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED ALL OPTIONS, 
OFFERS OR COUNTEROFFERS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR 
NOMENCLATURE, IS CLEARLY SUSTAINABLE ON APPEAL 
Point I of Appellant's brief states that the trial court 
should have found that Respondent never accepted Appellant's 
counteroffer. AB at I. In finding Respondent accepted the 
counteroffer, the trial court confirmed the jury's unanimous 
answer to a specific interrogatory, and further found that, 
regardless of the nomenclature applied to P5 and P15, "offer", 
"option", or "counteroffer", that Respondent accepted the same 
absent variation and within the prescribed time limits. See F13, 
19, 27, 40, 42 and 45. 
Summarizing Appellant's argument, he states that Trees 
rejected the counteroffer and failed to physically sign either the 
December 5th or the December 17th documents. AB at 7. He then 
selectively excerpts a portion of the May 27th conversation and 
construes it as being an oral rejection of the outstanding offer. 
AB at 7-8. Appellant argues that this "oral rejection" terminated 
Trees' power to accept the offer. Simultaneously, Appellant 
magnanimously indicates that he would have probably continued with 
the transaction after May 27th, had Respondent reaffirmed his 
commitments to the Appellant. AB at 8. Lastly, Appellant argues 
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that Respondent's May 29th letter should have clearly indicated 
that he was accepting a "counteroffer", not exercising an 
"option". Id. 
Analyzing the above contentions, Respondent first 
reasserts that both the jury and the trial judge found that he had 
accepted all outstanding offers, counteroffers, options or 
proposals, without variance, and that he did so by his tender on 
May 29th, 1981. See F19, 45; P24, 25. Regarding signature 
requirements, Appellant's arguments seem oblivious to 
well-established Utah doctrine pertaining to integration of 
instruments. Trees was in Sagaponik, New York at the time of the 
exercise of P5 and P15. The latter two exhibits were in Utah. 
Trees' exercise, by letter and accompanying check, in effect 
legally signed both P5 and P15. P24, 25. Trees' letter, P24, 
clearly states as follows: 
Dear Walter: In accordance with the terms of our 
contract, and the extensions thereof, I hereby exercise 
my option to purchase the property in Utah. 
Parole evidence clearly established that the words used by 
Appellant Lewis in referring to Exhibits P5 and P15 were "the 
option". See F27. Similarly, Respondent Trees testified that his 
intention in exercising "the option" was to be bound by both P5 
and P15. Supra at 17-18. Indeed, both parties stipulated that P5 
and PI5 were to be considered as one document for purposes of 
trial, and this stipulation becomes no less binding upon the 
Appellant because it is to his disadvantage on appeal. See, e.g., 
Higlee v. McDonald, No. 18755, filed April 27th, 1984. Indeed, 
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these two documents are the only ones upon which the Appellant, as 
signator, could be charged. 
The trial court did not find P24 unambiguous. T 4/14/83 
at 5. With some inherent ambiguity, the trial court properly 
considered evidence extrinsic to P24 to delineate Respondent's 
intent and the enforceability of his contractual obligations. See 
Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982); Reed v. Alvey, 610 
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); see also Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 
(Utah 1980) . Indeed, the principle of the Hackford and Alvey 
decisions, supra, has been a long-standing one in Utah law, 
particularly in Plaintiffs1 suits for specific performance. See, 
e.g., Keir v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 (1970); and 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261 at 266, 501 P.2d 
266 at 270 (1972). 
Clearly, Utah precedent allows that a separate writing 
may satisfy the signature requirements of the Statute of Frauds, 
so long as some nexus between the writings is shown. Further, 
[t]his requirement may be satisfied either by express 
reference in the signed writing to the unsigned one, or 
by implied reference gleaned from the contents of the 
writings and the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction. In the latter instance, parole evidence may 
be used to connect an unsigned document to one that has 
been signed by the person to be charged. See Gregerson 
v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980); see also Peterson 
v. Hendrick, 524 P.2d 321 (Utah 1974); and Miller v. 
Hancock, 67 Utah 202, 246 P. 949 (1926). 
Trees' testimony that he intended to accept both P5 and P15 was 
overwhelming. The jury so found. The terms used by Trees were 
exactly those terms which Appellant himself chose to use. See 
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F27. As a matter of law, Trees signed both P5 and P15. 
Gregerson, supra. 
Appellant's argument that Trees on May 27th orally 
terminated any option or offer extended to purchase the property 
further ignores the stipulation that P5 and P15 were left open for 
Respondent's acceptance until May 30th, 1981. See AB at 8; cf. 
supra at 10-11. Indeed, it is this stipulation which binds 
Appellant. Appellant's position that Trees orally rejected the 
outstanding offer is further repudiated by both parties' testimony 
that Trees concluded the conversation reaffirming his intent to 
honor all of his commitments to Appellant. Supra at 15-16. It is 
further to be noted that Trees' completed negotiations on the 
DeMille property alone were sufficient consideration to hold the 
documents open for acceptance until May 30th, 1981. In such a 
context, Lewis1 argument that a disputed oral conversation 
effectively terminated Trees' ability to accept the offer three 
days prior to its termination must fail. Indeed, in light of his 
stipulation, Appellant can hardly ask this Court to find that his 
offer terminated on May 27th. 
Prior Utah cases hold that a noncompliant acceptance of 
an outstanding offer does not, in itself, terminate the offer if 
other consideration binds the offeror to contractually hold the 
offer open. See J. R. Stone Company, Inc. v. Keate, 576 P.2d 1285 
at 1288 (Utah 1978) . Indeed, in attempting to retract his 
stipulation that P5 and P15 remained open for acceptance until May 
30th, Appellant construes a rejection of the same, not from the 
statements made by Trees, but rather from Trees' uncommunicated 
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thoughts. AB at 8. Appellant's counsel then states that up 
through June 12th of 1981, Lewis was probably disposed to 
reaffirming the offer. 3jd. This, however, controverts the trial 
court finding that after May 27th, Lewis had no intent to close, 
despite any effort made by Trees. Supra at 16-17. Indeed, both 
parties conceded that during the period for closing Trees begged 
Lewis what else Lewis desired in order to close, and that Lewis' 
response was stony silence. Supra at 18-19. Characteristically, 
Appellant testified that this behavior fulfilled an earlier 
promise that Appellant would give Trees a hard time and be a 
stubborn foe. Supra at 15-16; 2DWL at 125. 
Ultimately, despite parole clarification, Appellant's 
Point I claims that Respondent was required to state he was 
accepting a "counteroffer" or the "contract" as amended by Lewis. 
AB at 10. Through May 29th, 1981, however, the terminology 
universally employed by Appellant in referring to P5 and P15 was 
"the option". See F27. Indeed, Appellant testified that the word 
"counteroffer" was not one either Mr. Trees or himself had 
employed, but rather one first suggested to him by his counsel two 
weeks later on June 12th, 1981. (2DWL at 87, 109) 
Lastly, Appellant incongruously argues that Trees' 
silence constituted an oral rejection of P5 and P15. Trees tried 
to close several times, however, and specifically pled with Lewis 
what else was necessary to close the parties' contract. Supra at 
18. During this time, Appellant, not Respondent, remained rigidly 
silent. Indeed, the only information Trees got was that Lewis' 
attorney, Mr. Bell, was unhappy with P15. Supra at 19-20. 
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POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS THAT 
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE PARTIES; 
THESE CONTENTIONS ARE BOTTOMED ON PROPOSALS DRAFTED BY A 
NON-PARTY DURING SETTLEMENT AND ORALLY ENCOURAGED AND 
ACCEPTED BY THE APPELLANT HIMSELF; THESE PROPOSALS DID 
NOT CONSTITUTE THE INTENT OR UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
RESPONDENT ON MAY 29TH, 1981 
Appellant's second point on appeal argues that P28 and 
P29, when compared to P15, evidence a failure of the parties' 
minds to meet. Appellant's argument is sterile, however, and 
contrary to the following facts. First, in early June of 1981, 
during the period for closing P5 and P15, Lewis told both Milne 
and Trees that his attorney, Mr. Bell, did not find P15 
acceptable. T188, 191, 233. As a result, Lewis and Milne got 
together and drafted P28 and P29, with Lewis ultimately 
instructing Milne to have the documents signed by Respondent and 
then forwarded to Lewis' attorney. T192, 209. Trees did this 
thinking that Lewis desired it of him. T192-93, 208-11. 
Secondly, Trees testified P28 and P29 did not set forth his 
understanding of the parties' visitation agreement on May 29th, 
1981. Thus, although the agreements were within the context of 
the parties' understanding, Trees clarified that this 
understanding was more accurately set forth by P15. T188, 206, 
211. Clearly, on the date of exercise Trees' understanding and 
intent was to accept both P5 and P15. T188, 206-07. Thirdly, the 
trial court, on the basis of uncontroverted testimony, similarly 
found that P28 and P29 were not binding on Trees, but formed a 
portion of settlement negotiations, and were inadmissible pursuant 
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to Rules 52 and 45 of the then applicable Utah Rules of Evidence. 
T195-96, 226, 402-07, 409-11. 
In light of the above, Appellant's assertions that P28 
and P29, drafted by Milne with Lewis' concurrence weeks after 
Trees' exercise, somehow reflected Trees' intent on May 29th, 1981 
are incredible. It is incongruous that Lewis should now compare 
these documents to P15, the document accepted by Trees, and 
suggest this belated comparison reflects Trees' state of mind on 
May 29th, 1981. Trees' testimony as to his acceptance of P15 as 
clearly defining the visitation agreement never varied throughout 
trial. Indeed, as found by the trial court, Respondent has never 
withdrawn his tendered acceptance of both P5 and P15 without 
alteration and modification. See F44. Ultimately, by reason of 
the parties' stipulation that P15 set forth their visitation 
agreement, as bolstered by the testimony of both, the trial court 
held that P15 accurately set forth Lewis' agreed visitation 
rights. And, as both P5 and P15 were extended to May 30th, 1981, 
these documents comprise the substance of the only offer, option, 
or counteroffer then chargeable to Lewis as seller, regarding 
which Trees had an opportunity to accept or exercise on May 29th, 
1981. See POINT II, supra. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO OMITTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE 
INAPPOSITE; SUCH JURY INSTRUCTIONS EITHER MISSTATE THE 
LAW OR ARE INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE OR WERE 
SUFFICIENTLY COVERED BY OTHER INSTRUCTIONS 
In Point III of Appellant's brief, he indicates that the 
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that an offer or 
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counteroffer is terminated by a communicated rejection, and cannot 
be subject to a later acceptance. Appellant's theorizes that 
Trees orally rejected Lewis' proposal on May 27th, 1981, and thus 
terminated the same. . 
As previously set forth, however, these jury 
instructions neither conform to the facts, the parties' 
stipulations, nor Utah case law. First, Appellant's version of 
the May 27th, 1981 conversation selectively omits testimony from 
both parties that Trees ended the conversation pledging to honor 
all commitments made to Lewis, and immediately phoned Hatch at 
Lewis' request. Supra at 15-17. Secondly, Appellant's desired 
instruction, indicating that any outstanding proposals were 
terminated by the May 27th, 1981 conversation, is inimical to a 
joint stipulation. This stipulation provides that regardless of 
the nomenclature of P5 and P15, the same were open for Trees' 
acceptance through May 30th, 1981. Supra at 10-11. Simply 
stated, Appellant's suggestion that these instructions would have 
eliminated any need for the jury to consider the efficaciousness 
of Trees' timely May 29th letter of exercise, P24, are directly 
contrary to an accepted stipulation. Id.., cjf. AB at 13. Thirdly, 
beyond the parties' stipulation, Appellant conceded that P5 and 
P15 were held open to May 30th, 1981 by consideration. This 
consisted of both Trees' tender of $1,500 and his continuing and 
ultimately successful negotiations for the DeMille purchase. As 
discussed in J. R. Stone Company, Inc. v. Keate, 576 P.2d 1285 
(Utah 1978), offers supported by consideration are not terminated 
prior to the agreed time by noncompliant tenders. Appellant 
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attempts to construe a May 27th, 1981 oral conversation as akin to 
a rejection of P5 and P15. Appellant's theory and interpretation, 
however, are contrary to the facts, the stipulations of the 
parties, and indeed the applicable Utah case law. Appellant's 
instructions based thereon were properly omitted, and contrary to 
the jury's specific finding that Respondent accepted both P5 and 
P15 on May 29th, 1981. See F39, 40.
 t 
In the second portion of Point III of Appellant's brief, 
he objects to the trial court's failure to give a specific legal 
instruction relative to the Statute of Frauds. The actual jury 
instructions drafted by the court after extensive consultation 
with both counsel appear in the record at R3, 289. Instruction 
No. 22 formulated by the trial court specifically instructed the 
advisory jury, inter alia, as follows: 
The acceptance of a counteroffer would require the 
signature of the party who accepts same, or his duly 
authorized agent, and such party would be bound in all 
respects by the terms of such counteroffer. In this 
case the party to accept the counteroffer, if any you so 
find, would be James F. Trees. R3 at 321. 
The court also instructed the jurors that an offer in writing to 
perform (tender) is equivalent to actual performance if all other 
respects of the offer are in accord with the parties' agreement. 
R3 at 317. 
Secondly, the Statute of Frauds was fully complied with, 
as both P5 and P15 were extended by Lewis, the party to be 
charged, and by P24 Trees also accepted and signed those documents 
by integration. Supra at POINT II. 
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Appellant then contends that Trees did not agree that 
the visitation rights be put in writing. This statement has no 
support in the record. Trees was ready, willing and able to close 
and come to Utah to physically sign P15 during June, 1981, the 
contractual closing period. Supra at 18-19. Lewis, not Trees, 
refused to close. As finally closed, the recorded documents 
evidence Appellant's rights of retained visitation. P59, 60, 
Supp. Record, 6/84. 
Appellant's objections to the jury instructions further-
fail to comply with Rule 51, U.R.C.P., as discussed in Beehive 
Medical Electronics v. Square D Company, 669 P.2d 859 (Utah 1983). 
Also, Appellant has failed to set forth wherein all of the 
instructions read in harmony fail to fairly present in a clear and 
understandable way the issues of fact and applicable law in the 
instant case. See, e.g. , Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 at 175 
(Utah 1983) . 
Ultimately, compliance with the Statute of Frauds is a 
legal issue, and though fairly presented to the advisory jury, and 
clearly complied with by Trees, the issue need not have been 
presented to the advisory jury at all. Simply stated, Appellant 
is not entitled to a jury trial of any issue as a matter of right 
in a case predominantly equitable in nature. See Coleman v. 
Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981). The jury was appropriately 
instructed pertaining to Respondent's required written acceptance. 
Respondent, by an integrated acceptance, complied with the Statute 
of Frauds. There is no reversible error. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED P28 AND P29 PURSUANT TO 
RULES 45 AND 52 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
In his Point IV, Appellant argues the admissibility of 
P28 and P29, alleging that they directly contradict Trees1 
statement that he had always been willing to accept P15. 
Appellant states that P28 and P29, being signed by Trees, bound 
him, and that he never represented that these did not represent 
his point of view. Respondent refers this Court to Point III, 
supra, insofar as P28 and P29 comprised proposals drafted by Milne 
in consultation with Appellant and submitted to Trees with the 
indication that if Trees signed, this case would be settled. 
Trees testified that while these documents approximated the 
parties' visitation agreement, PI5 was what Trees understood and 
exercised his acceptance on May 29th, 1981. Supra at 29-31. 
Indeed, P28 and P29 not even in existence at that time! 
The trial court, after extensive hearings, excluded 
these exhibits by reason of both Rules 45 and 52 of the then 
applicable Utah Rules of Evidence. T386-411. Clearly, under Rule 
52 these offers of compromise suggested by Lewis and signed by 
Trees at Lewis' request should not be used to indicate Trees' 
state of mind three weeks prior thereto. Rule 52, URE; see also 
Annot., 26 ALR 2d 878; 15 ALR 3d 13. Alternatively, even were 
such documents admissible for some limited purpose, the trial 
court further found that their probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the potential consumption of time and misleading of 
the jury that their introduction may well have caused. T409-11. 
34 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this regard, Appellant has not demonstrated in any way where 
the trial court abused its discretion and that injustice resulted 
therefrom. Absent this additional showing, Appellant's arguments 
must likewise be rejected. See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 
(Utah 1982). 
POINT VI 
ATTORNEY SNOW1S TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE; THERE WAS NO 
SURPRISE TO APPELLANT 
In Point V of Appellant's brief he argues that the trial 
court erred in permitting the "surprise waiver" of the 
attorney-client relationship by allowing attorney Snow to testify 
at trial. The argument that the court erred in allowing such 
testimony fails on at least three grounds. 
A. There was no surprise to Appellant. 
Appellant took Snow's deposition on October 28th, 1981. 
As Trees was in New York, Snow, without instruction from Trees, 
was instructed by Snow's acting counsel, Hughes, to invoke the 
privilege. When Snow's remaining a witness became evident, Trees 
retained Hughes and clearly stated his position that regardless of 
the nomenclature of P5 and P15, the same had been accepted. See 
RI at 83, liS 58(B) and 59: see also F19. 
Affidavits of both attorney Thompson and attorney Hughes 
indicate that Jim Trees first waived his attorney-client privilege 
at his deposition November 20th, 1981. See R3 at 193; R4 at 21; 
Deposition of James Frederick Trees [hereinafter JFT] at 133. 
Additionally, every pretrial order submitted by either party in 
this case lists Steven E. Snow as a witness. At a pretrial 
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conference in December of 1982, Respondent's counsel disclosed 
that Mr. Trees would be waiving his attorney-client privilege. 
Appellant's counsel then indicated that he would like to redepose 
Mr. Snow, and as a result the court specifically left discovery 
open until January 10th, 1983 for that purpose. R4 at 21-22, 
24-26; R3 at 318-22. Appellant's counsel never availed himself of 
this opportunity. Finally on the day previous to Mr. Snow's 
taking the witness stand, both of Respondent's counsel approached 
Appellant's counsel with Mr. Snow to afford Mr. Bell the 
opportunity to interview and discuss with Snow the latter's 
testimony. Id., see also T341. 
Appellant's reliance on Phipps v. Sasser, 445 P.2d 624 
(Wash. 1968) is misplaced. Indeed, Phipps holds that the 
timeliness of waiver of privilege cannot be determined by some 
specific point in time applicable to every case. The Phipps Court 
then added that the mere listing of a privileged witness on a 
pretrial order waives the privilege and subjects him to open 
discovery. Judge Burns left discovery open through January 10th 
of 1983, specifically to allow Mr. Bell to take an additional 
deposition of Snow. R3 at 318-22; R4 at 21-22, 24-26. Mr. Bell 
declined. On appeal he now claims he was never given this 
opportunity. AB at 20. Not only was attorney Bell given the 
same, but not having taken it, Respondent's counsel reviewed 
Snow's testimony privately with Bell prior to Snow's taking the 
witness stand. There was no surprise. 
B. Appellant's counsel opened the door to Snow's 
testimony at trial. 
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The testimony of Trees' and Snow's conversations 
regarding P24 now objectionable to Appellant were first elicited 
by Appellant's own cross-examination of Trees. AB at 15; but see 
T141-42, 211-13, 238, 242-43. Ultimately, Snow took the witness 
stand only to confirm Trees1 specific earlier testimony elicited 
on Mr. Bell's cross-examination. Furthermore, in the early stages 
of trial Mr. Bell's only objection to Snow's testimony was that it 
was either heresay or that the questioning itself was suggestive. 
See T238, 337. Indeed, Mr. Bell's statement in reference to these 
conversations during trial is telling: 
Mr. Bell: Your Honor, this is a very critical area, and 
there were many discussions that day on May 
28th, and we've had a let to talk about, and 
I'd like this witness [Mr. Snow] to testify 
to as what he remembers and not have any 
suggestions. T334-35. 
These May 28th conversations directly evidenced Trees' 
intent when exercising the contract in his letter and tender of 
May 29th. P24, 25. Trees drafted P24 relying on these 
conversations Jield the previous day with Snow. Although initially 
elicited by Bell, it was only after all of the material testimony 
had come in that Bell, finding the testimony damaging, claimed 
that he had been surprised. T339-40. 
As Appellant's counsel was first to broach the subject 
of conversations held between Trees and his prior counsel at 
trial, he is presently precluded from asserting any objections 
thereto on appeal. Having opened the door to this testimony, it 
is incongruous that after it is received the Appellant now objects 
to it. See Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 18254, filed 
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April 12th, 1984, IIC; Legler Construction Inc. v. Roberts Inc., 
550 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976). 
C. Appellant waived any objection to Snow's testimony 
by his failure to adhere to Utah's contemporaneous objection rule. 
As set forth in Point VI B, supra, Appellant's first 
objection to Snow's testimony, and indeed Trees' testimony as to 
Snow's statements to him, came well after such testimony was 
introduced. Having opened the door to such testimony, Appellant's 
counsel initially objected to the same in only two limited 
instances as being either heresay or responsive to suggestive 
questioning. T238, 337. His first objection claiming a surprise 
waiver of the privilege was not only untimely but well after the 
subject had been completely broached by both sides, and indeed, 
even after Appellant's counsel had indicated he desired to hear 
Mr. Snow's testimony. See T334-39. As a result of counsel's 
failure to contemporaneously object at trial, this issue must not 
now be considered on appeal. See, Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc., No. 18254, filed April 12th, 1984 at Point IIB. 
POINT VII 
APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE LOWER COURT'S AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S TEES IS CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW 
The trial court, after extensive testimony, entered a 
series of findings awarding attorney's fees of $45,000 to 
Respondent. T698-729; F58-63. Appellant does not specifically 
assail any of these findings, but rather asks this Court to simply 
speculate that such fees were unreasonable. Beyond the testimony 
proffered at trial and the contractual basis for attorney's fees, 
a perusal of the file reveals that the case was extensive. At 
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least eight lengthy depositions were taken, yet only two were 
noticed by Respondent. Several pretrials were conducted and/or 
continued, and the matter, at Appellant's request, was ultimately 
tried before an advisory jury for four days. Post-judgment 
motions primarily filed by Appellant were scheduled throughout the 
spring of 1983, so that the judgment was not executed until May of 
1983, more than three months after trial. R3 at 28. Further 
arguments additionally setting forth the basis for the fees were 
also submitted to the trial court in extensive memoranda. R3 at 
90-106, 283-300. 
Clearly, the trial court had the discretion to make the 
award; it approximates 55% of that to which Respondent's counsel 
testified. See Appliance and Heating Supply, Inc. vs. Telaroli, 
No. 19450, filed May 14th, 1984. Indeed, the award is 
substantially less than the monies expended by Respondent in this 
matter. Respondent is further entitled to attorney's fees on 
appeal. Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391 (Utah 1984). 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT'S SUBMISSION OF INTERROGATORY NO. 5 TO 
THE JURY IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
In Point VII of his brief, Appellant argues that the 
submission of Interrogatory No. 5 to the jury was prejudicial and 
confusing. A3 at 21-22. District court judges are rarely able to 
defend their decisions on appeal. In this case, however, a 
dialogue between Appellant's counsel and the District Court Judge 
is telling: 
The Court: You should keep in mind that the jury is an 
advisory jury and the Court submitted those 
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interrogatories to the jury. And the record 
should show that the language of the last 
interrogatory [interrogatory no. 5] was 
changed and tailored specifically at the 
request of counsel for the defendant 
[appellant] as the Court was approaching the 
bench to instruct the jury, and that the 
trial court executive made the changes while 
the Court was on the bench, consistent with 
the language desired by Mr. Bell. . . All 
right, Mr. Bell, correct me if I am in 
error, when we were in chambers settling at 
least any palpable error in the jury 
instructions, as proposed, and interroga-
tories, in chambers, the Court excused 
counsel and I put my robe on and started 
out, and after I left my chambers, but while 
waining [sic] between chambers and the 
courtroom, you asked, with Mr. Hughes and 
Mr. Thompson, to confer with the Court with 
respect to changing some of the language in 
that fifth interrogatory. The Court 
listened to it, and I didn't agree with it, 
but both counsel indicated they wanted that 
change . . .Mr. Bell, do I misstate that? 
Mr. Bell: No. T 4/1/83 at 29-31. 
On appeal Mr. Bell incongruously contends that the 
giving of the jury instruction he urged the court to submit to the 
jury now constitutes reversible error I Any error which may be 
perceived by this Court, however, has been previously waived by 
Mr. Bell's own actions. Indeed, as Appellant's counsel suggested 
that the instruction be given, it can hardly be gainsaid that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in submitting the 
instruction to the jury. Absent abuse, the interrogatory should 
not disturb the jury verdict. See E. A. Strout Western Realty 
Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983). 
Furthermore, not only was the instruction given within the broad 
discretion of the trial court, in light of the answers to 
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interrogatories 3 and 4, the submission of instruction no. 5 
constitutes little more than harmless error. F 39-40. 
POINT IX 
SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
Specific performance as a remedy is not rigidly 
doctrinaire in nature; its burden^ and standards of proof should 
be invoked only to protect from injustice, and not as a weapon 
with which to perpetrate an injustice. See Kier v. Condrack, 25 
Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 (1970). Contracts need not provide for 
every collateral matter or possible contingency to be specifically 
performed. See Nixon and Nixon, Inc. v. John New and Associates, 
641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982). Dealing with written instruments, this 
Court has held that realty contracts, like others, should be 
construed as a whole, and that potential diverse interpretations 
thereof do not render the same unenforceable. See Jones v. 
Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980). Ultimately, the granting of 
specific performance must always be tempered by the firm 
proposition . . . 
that the parties to a contract are obliged to proceed in 
good faith to cooperate in performing the contract in 
accordance with its expressed intent. . . Quite beyond 
this, one party to a contract cannot by willful act or 
omission make it impossible or difficult for the other 
to perform and then invoke the other's non-performance 
as a defense. Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1979) . 
As stated by the Ferris Court, being an equitable remedy, 
[t]he trial court has considerable discretion in 
determining whether equity and good conscience require 
that . . . [specific performance] be granted. Id., at 
859. 
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The following comprise alternative grounds sustaining the advisory 
jury and trial court decision. 
A. Statutory Tender. 
The trial court found on substantial evidence that from 
and after May 27th, 1981 there was no performance which Trees 
might have tendered upon which Appellant would have closed on the 
parties' transaction. Supra at 16-17. As suchf tender by Trees 
under Utah law as a condition precedent to specific performance 
would be legally unnecessary. See Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 
1152 (Utah 1976); Thomas v. Johnson, 55 Utah 424, 186 P. 437 
(1919) . In the instant case, both parties stipulated that, 
regardless of its nomenclature, Trees1 opportunity to accept 
Appellant's proposal extended through May 30th, 1981 and that the 
manner of acceptance was governed by paragraph 5 of P5. Supra at 
10-11; see also F10, 23. On May 29th, 1981, Respondent made such 
a tender, and the same was received shortly thereafter by 
Appellant. P24, 25; supra at 17-18. Appellant held this tender 
for over two weeks without comment, and remained silent even after 
Trees begged him what else was necessary in order to close. Supra 
at 18-19. Respondent never specified where the tender was 
defective. Ixi.; F49-51, 53. Under Utah law, the person to whom a 
tender is made must, at the time, specify any objections he may 
have to it or they are waived. Respondent waived any objections. 
§78-27-3, UCA, 1953; 74 AmJur2d, "Tender" §10; see also Hansen v. 
Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976) and Hackford v. Snow, 657 
P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982) n. 7. 
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B. Contractual Tender. 
In Timpanogas Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481 
(Utah 1975) , the Utah Supreme Court held that usually one who 
refuses a tender should state the basis of his refusal. 
Construing the material terms of the parties' agreement, paragraph 
11 of P5 would clearly have required Appellant, acting in good 
faith, to have specified in writing any objection he may have had 
to Trees' tender, and allowed an opportunity for Trees to cure. 
See Fll, 53. This Appellant chose not to do, as he knew full well 
that Trees' clear intention was to complete the transaction, and 
indeed do anything Appellant requested in order to close. Supra 
at 18-19. Indeed, in light of Trees' substantial compliance with 
all the terms of the parties' agreement, employing those phrases 
used by Appellant himself, Lewis' unilateral renegging on their 
contract alone justified the trial court's decision. See F19, 27, 
43, 45, 51; see also Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 at 1297 
(Utah 1982) . 
C. Good Faith. 
The lead Utah case regarding good faith is Ferris v. 
Jennings, supra. In Ferris, a real estate agent, by mere silence, 
attempted to frustrate a contract by failing to set forth, despite 
repeated requests, the amount of a "fair commission" which he was 
to receive from an oral contract to convey real estate. Mr. 
Bell's client here acted no differently than did the agent in 
Ferris. Thus, despite Trees' repeated pleadings during the period 
of close as to what additional performance would satisfy Lewis, 
Lewis responded with little more than characteristic stony 
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silence, or statements to the effect that he had simply "lost 
faith" in the transaction. Supra at 18-19. The only faith Lewis 
had lost was good faith. Although unnecessary to the trial 
court's decision, when Appellant's counsel specifically requested 
a finding that his client had not acted in bad faith, the trial 
court denied the same. T 4/14/83 at 11. 
D. Estoppel. 
Appellant in this case committed to Respondent that his 
"option" was open for acceptance through May 30th of 1981. In 
exchange for that promise, Lewis requested that Trees first be 
able to close on the DeMille transaction, a piece of property 
which Appellant concedes was little more than a pile of rocks. 
Supra at 3; P23. In reliance thereon, Respondent committed to 
purchasing the DeMille property on May 26th, 1981. F31. It was 
uncontroverted that the final purchase price for the DeMille 
parcel was substantially in excess of its real value. Supra at 
14. Appellant is estopped from denying the contract. See Morgan 
v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976); and J. P. Koch, 
Inc. v. J. C. Penney Company, Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975). 
E. Frustration of Contract. 
Respondent incorporates the facts and law in Point IX 
A-D, supra. Clearly, Appellant, otherwise imposed with a duty, 
should not be entitled by his willful acts or omissions, to make 
it impossible or difficult for Trees to perform and then argue 
that Trees' alleged failure to perform is a defense to specific 
performance. Lewis simply refused to close, never stating why. 
See Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 at 859 (Utah 1979). 
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F. Part-Performance. 
(1) Before trial—Historically to either remove 
oral contracts from the Statute of Frauds or overcome allegations 
of indefiniteness, part-performance has generally required both 
occupation and improvement of real estate. Nonetheless, a line of 
Utah cases have held that economic detriment alone, if 
specifically tied to the contract, is sufficient to satisfy the 
doctrine. See, e.g., LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 26 
Utah 2d 158, 486 P.2d 1040 (1971); Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust 
Company, 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956); and Van Natta v. 
Heywood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192 (1920). In the instant case on 
April 25, 1981, Appellant specifically conditioned Trees' ability 
to accept the "option" on Trees first being "able to acquire the 
DeMille property". P23. In fulfilling Appellant's request, 
Respondent committed $846,000 to be able to purchase the DeMille 
property, over $230,000 in excess of its value. P58, T136-38. 
Trees' May 26, 1981 commitment to purchase the DeMille parcel 
alone constitutes part-performance. 
(2) After trial—As set forth supra at 21, Trees 
has peacefully occupied the property and made substantial 
improvements thereon for well over a year at the time of the 
filing of this brief. He has, furthermore, tendered two checks to 
the Appellant which Appellant cashed. No supersedeas bond has 
been filed. Thus, even under a historic viewpoint of 
part-performance, Trees has occupied and made substantial 
improvements on the ground. Coupled with the checks tendered in 
compliance with the court-ordered decree of specific performance, 
A * 
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a reversal would now require a peaceful occupant to vacate against 
his will property he purchased and has improved. A reversal would 
further, of necessity, require Appellant to return those monies to 
Respondent which he has accepted pursuant to the decree of 
specific performance. Consequently, a reversal would contravene 
the behavior of both parties undertaken, from all appearances, in 
total conformity with the trial court's decree. 
G. Breach of Contract. 
Appellant has never complied with paragraph 11 of P5. 
See also subsection IX B, supra. 
H. Reformation. 
On the basis of the evidence proffered at trial and 
recited supra at 2-21, were there any problems in the language to 
be contained in the deed and mortgage, the trial court in an 
equity case would be empowered to reform such documents to conform 
to the parties1 agreement, where to do otherwise would result in 
an injustice. See Mabey v. Peterson, No. 18338, filed April 24th, 
1984. Clearly, P59 and 60, as executed pursuant to the trial 
court's decree of specific performance, conform exactly to what 
both parties intended in the instant case. Supp. Record 6/84. 
Indeed, pursuant to such exhibits, Respondent has occupied the 
subject property and Appellant has received and cashed checks 
tendered in conformity with the mortgage note, the executed 
original of which was mailed to Appellant. R4 at 36-37, 42-43. 
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POINT X 
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO AN APPEAL 
After trial and pursuant to the decree of specific 
performance, Appellant voluntarily vacated the subject matter 
property and Respondent moved to the ranch on or about June 17th, 
1983. See P59, 60; see also supra at 21. The original mortgage 
note has been tendered to Appellant with two checks totalling 
$70,000 in conformity to the decree of specific performance. The 
first check was a cashier's check and the second a personal check; 
neither had any restrictive language on them at the time of 
tender. Id. Appellant cashed both checks on September 9th, 1983, 
indicating on the reverse side his intent to obtain interest 
thereon pending the outcome in this appeal. Respondent contends 
that Appellant's acceptance of the checks and retention of these 
monies constitutes a waiver of Appellant's right to appeal the 
decree of specific performance which entitled Appellant to the 
checks in the first place. Respondent earlier unsuccessfully 
moved to dismiss this appeal, but the argument was reserved for 
plenary appeal. Thereafter, Appellant belatedly sought a Court 
order sanctioning his cashing the checks or otherwise allowing him 
to return the monies to Respondent, arguing that he had now become 
a self-appointed trustee. This order was denied. 
By a vast majority of precedent, 
[a] party who accepts benefits under a judgment waives 
his rights to appeal with the actual intent of the party 
pertaining to that right of appeal as a general rule 
being 'immaterial1. See 4 AmJur2d, "Appeal and Error", 
§250; see also 169 ALR at 1056. 
Appellant's effort to return or tender back these monies is of no 
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avail to restore the rights lost. See 4 AmJur2d, "Appeal and 
Error", §251; see also 169 ALR 1057. Thus, in Sierra Nevada Mill 
Company v. Keith O'Brien Company, 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943 (1916), 
Chief Justice Straup indicated that where the receipt of benefits 
under a contract is indivisible from the validity thereof, their 
receipt barred further prosecution of an appeal challenging the 
contract. 
In Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Company, 56 
Utah 190, 188 P. 1117, 1118 (1920), Justice Frick stated the 
applicable rule as follows: 
It is elementary that in case a party to an action 
accepts the benefits of a judgment in his favor or 
acquiesces in a judgment against him, he thereby waives 
his right to have such judgment reviewed on appeal. 
In Ottenheimer the lessee appealed a termination of his lease. 
Subsequent to trial, however, he voluntarily surrendered the 
premises. As the lessee's issues on appeal all sought 
reaffirmation of the lease, by voluntarily abandoning the 
property, the Court concluded that regardless of the lessee's 
subjective intent, his behavior, nonetheless, objectively required 
a waiver of the litigated questions, precluding appellate review. 
See also Cornia v. Cornia, 15 P.2d 631 (Utah 1932). 
In Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (Utah 
1973), the Utah Supreme Court considered an appeal, despite the 
Appellant's acceptance of monies. In so holding, however, the 
Jensen court specifically found that the parts of the judgment 
appealed from were separate and distinct from the ruling upon 
which the payments had been conditioned. See 30 Utah 2d at 157. 
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In the instant case, however, Appellant's right to receive monies 
is directly related to the judgment and decree of specific 
performance. The Jensen case was cited favorably and this 
distinction noted by Chief Justice Hall in Hollingsworth v. 
Farmers Insurance Company, 655 P.2d 637 (Utah 1982). 
The fact that not all the payments have been made is of 
no consequence, insofar as they are being timely made as required 
by the decree. Appellant's acceptance of substantial benefits in 
excess of $70,000, and his retention of the note alone are clearly 
sufficient. See 4 CJS, "Appeal and Error", §215 at 644-45. 
Furthermore, were Appellant to argue that he cashed the check so 
that at least someone could obtain interest thereon, or that 
otherwise he might be denied interest on the sale by the appellate 
process, this argument, at least as to Trees' personal check for 
$35,000, is unfounded. Personal checks, otherwise uncashed, do 
not terminate interest to a seller in a judicial setting. See 
Pack v. Hull Development Company Inc., 667 P.2d 39 (Utah 1983). 
Thus, had the personal check remained uncashed, interest would 
still be imposed on Respondent's purchase price in favor of 
Appellant. Id.., see also Le Vine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 
P. 2 (1910). 
Appellant voluntarily chose to cash these checks. He 
retains, either personally or through his attorney, the original 
mortgage note tendered according to the decree of specific 
performance. He has vacated the property. He has filed no 
supersedeas bond. Yet he seeks an appellate reversal which would 
now require Trees to vacate the property and accept his money back 
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on a draft prepared by Appellant. Clearly, this Court should not 
entertain an appeal contrary to the simple thrust of all of Lewis1 
affirmative acts. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR DAMAGES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
In the event this Court reverses the decree of specific 
performance, Respondent contends that the trial court erred in 
finding that Respondent had failed to present a prima facie case 
for damages in the alternative to specific performance. Clearly, 
Appellant was well aware that in compelling Trees to be able to 
purchase the DeMille property, he was in effect compelling 
Respondent to negotiate the purchase a pile of rocks at a greatly 
inflated price. Supra at POINT IX F(2). Conversations throughout 
the spring of 1981 were held between Respondent and Appellant, and 
Appellant was well aware that the DeMilles had been both difficult 
to deal with and worthy foes in Trees1 negotiations with them. 
Having clearly placed Trees in the position where, by personal, 
legal and moral commitments he was required to close with the 
DeMilles, if this Court reverses the decree of specific 
performance, then the Court should also remand the matter so that 
the legal issue of Trees1 damages may be appropriately determined 
by the jury. Indeed, insofar as the trial court dismissed this 
portion of Respondent's case without submission to the jury, the 
standards of appellate review favor reversal, and every inference 
should be construed in Trees' favor. Of course, this cross-appeal 
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is material only in the event that the decree of specific 
performance is not affirmed on any of the many available grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury verdict and trial court's judgment should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of June, 1984. 
IAEL 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of July, 1984, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL to J. Richard Bell, attorney 
for Appellant, at 303 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84115, postage prepaid. 
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